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Crime problems largely result from opportunities, temptations, and provocations that have 
been provided unintentionally by those pursuing other private interests. There is a widespread 
notion that the state and its agencies can and ought to take full responsibility for crime 
control, and that there is, therefore, nothing that nonstate actors can or need to do. In practice, 
there is little that the state can do directly to address the opportunities, temptations and 
provocations for crime, but where crime control responsibilities have been accepted in the 
private sector, successful measures to reduce opportunities and temptations have been 
devised and adopted, preventing many crimes and reducing costs that would otherwise fall on 
the state as well as on victims. This article sets out the reasons why a shift in responsibility 
for crime prevention from the public to private sector can produce patterns of crime control 
that are both effective and socially desirable, albeit important roles remain for the public 
sector in stimulating and supporting such measures. 
 





Some scholars seem to have an almost visceral dislike of security, situational crime 
prevention, and the notion that the private sector has responsibilities and capacities for 
delivering crime prevention that is in the public interest (for example Young 1986; Zedner 
2003; Neocleous 2007). 
 Crime is deemed to be a function of criminality, which springs from individual or 
social pathology. Real prevention is achieved only by addressing such “root causes.” Absent 
efforts to deal with these, little can be achieved beyond redistribution of the burdens of crime. 
The involvement of the private sector is liable, if anything, to shift that burden toward those 
who lack the resources to defend themselves. Situational measures risk being exclusionary 
and ugly, threaten privacy, jeopardize civil liberties, and blame victims. 
 This critique of situational crime prevention and privatized crime control suggests that 
crime prevention should be in the hands of the public sector, which alone can deal with crime 
and criminality in ways that are effective, equitable, and accord with public interests. 
 I have argued elsewhere that situational crime prevention has a radical core that 
challenges many conventional assumptions about the causes of crime and ways it can 
successfully be prevented and which also paves the way for delivering strategies that are 
equitable both in allocation of crime prevention resources and crime distribution outcomes. 
(Tilley 2016). Following up on that earlier article, here I argue that a shift in responsibility 
for crime prevention from the public to private sector can produce patterns of crime control 
that are both effective and socially desirable. I also argue, however, that such a shift requires 
substantial public sector activity and involvement. The argument proceeds through eight 
steps: 
 
1. Many crime problems stem from opportunities, temptations, and provocations created 
unintentionally by those pursuing other private interests.  
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2. There is little that the state can do directly to address causes of crime inadvertently 
supplied by the private sector.  
3. In contemporary societies it is widely assumed that the state and its criminal justice 
agencies can and should control all crime. 
4. The private sector can implement successful measures to control crime by reducing 
opportunities, temptations, and provocations. 
5. The privatization of crime control has activated market mechanisms that have led to 
the development and application of effective and benign means of reducing 
opportunities and temptations to commit crime. 
6. Privatizing crime control can be difficult, even where substantial crime prevention 
benefits may follow, especially where businesses are expected to bear the costs but 
not to benefit financially.  
7. The public and voluntary sectors have important roles to play in informing, 
encouraging, enabling, underpinning, and extending the benign privatization of crime 
control. 
8. The public sector’s own efforts to regulate behavior can be criminogenic, 
inadvertently creating temptations and opportunities for crime. “Elegant” regulation 
aims to avoid these consequences. 
 
 
1. Many crime problems stem from opportunities, temptations, and provocations created 
unintentionally by those pursuing other private interests. 
 Opportunity causes crime (Felson and Clarke 1998). Opportunities for crime come 
and go as side effects of developments with other purposes (Tilley 2012). The Internet 
furnishes one important, recent and rich new source of crime opportunities that was not 
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previously available. Romance scams, for instance, are facilitated by online dating sites, 
which are run for commercial purposes and designed to meet the needs of those seeking 
partners. Dating sites are clearly popular in attracting many users who find them rewarding. 
The concentration of romance scams on a small proportion of those sites suggests that the 
ways in which websites are configured affect the risks to users (Sidebottom and Tilley 2017).  
 What goes for the Internet as a generator of romance scams in particular goes for 
many other types of private sector initiatives: a new innovation is made; it is commercially 
successful; it becomes very popular and it leads to crime opportunities, temptations, or 
provocations as a side effect (Pease 1997). These criminogenic side effects are concentrated 
on a particular subset of potential targets (Eck and Eck 2012; Tilley 2012).  
 Widely welcomed technological developments have often included the inadvertent 
supply of crime opportunities or provocations. Cars, carbines, credit cards, cell phones, 
laptops, and the Internet are all examples. In each case a substantial crime dividend has 
followed from advances that most have bought into (and from which entrepreneurs have 
profited), but that have created or improved opportunities for crime. These opportunities 
relate to the provision of attractive targets for thieves (cash, cars, carbines, credit cards, cell 
phones) and new resources facilitating the commission of crime (cash, cars, carbines, credit 
cards, cell phones, and the Internet). Likewise, many developments of commercial practices 
have been welcomed by consumers, but have again supplied opportunities for crime. Self-
service stores, nightclubs, and the complex financial instruments used by bankers are 
examples here, respectively facilitating or provoking theft, violence, and fraud.  
 
2. There is little that the state can do directly to address causes of crime inadvertently 
supplied by the private sector. 
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 The state is unable directly to change the opportunities inadvertently created by 
private sector organizations. The state does not design or manufacture products that supply 
opportunities, nor does it manage private sector organizations whose practices and processes 
unintentionally provoke or create opportunities for crime.  
Let us return to online dating sites and romance scams. There are estimated to be at 
least 1,400 online dating sites. Over a third of marriages in the United States originate in a 
meeting that followed an initial contact through such sites (Sidebottom and Tilley 2017). 
They therefore provide a valued service. They are no longer fringe affairs but are part of the 
mainstream. Yet for some users they furnish opportunities for scammers, who are able to sift 
through profiles to work out who might be open to grooming as potential targets. The sites 
also provide an opportunity for fraudsters to tailor their own profiles to give them the best 
chance of hooking the vulnerable and then to groom them over a sustained period. I  
Romance scams are clearly emotionally and financially damaging for those who fall 
for them. They are also increasing in number – in England and Wales there was a 34 per cent 
increase in those reported between 2014 and 2015. The conditions enabling romance scams, 
however, are not in the hands of the state. There are, however, ways in which providers of 
internet dating sites can reduce opportunities. They can do so by setting ground rules for 
users, by alerting potential victims to their risks where they appear to be acting in ways that 
make them soft targets, by rooting out suspicious profiles and dating site usage to exclude 
some likely scammers or warn likely victims, and so on.  
As indicated earlier romance scams are highly concentrated. In England and Wales, 
42 per cent of reported romance scams were accounted for by one of 37 sites that reported 
one or more between 2013 and 2014. The most scammed site had 600 reported cases per 
million website visitors, the least presumably none, although the reported crime data clearly 
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goes down only to one (Sidebottom and Tilley 2017). Only those running sites can put in 
place systems that minimize risks to their users. 
 
3. In contemporary societies it is widely assumed that the state and, in particular, its criminal 
justice agencies can and should control all crime.  
 If we look back far enough, it is clear that measures preventing predation to self and 
closely related others go back to prehistory. Ecologists have identified diverse strategies that 
have evolved in plants and animals to reduce their immediate and long-term risks from 
others, thereby enabling them to survive. Strategies include camouflage, prickles, the reality 
(or appearance) of being poisonous or dangerous, stings, repulsive smells, and early warning 
systems that alert potential victims to risks (for examples, see Davies, Krebs, and West 
2012).  
 As organized social life emerged, forms of co-operative protection from threats 
emerged and grew in significance. Some behaviors eventually came to be defined as “crimes” 
and their enforcement was put in the hands of the state, albeit citizens were often obliged to 
do their bit, as in “Hue and Cry,” which made citizens in medieval times responsible for 
helping to apprehend suspects (see Zedner 2006). Over time, however, the roles and 
responsibilities assigned to private citizens diminished. 
 Engstad and Evans (1980) note that following the establishment of the metropolitan 
police in 1829, “The evolution of social and legal institutions has been accompanied by a 
gradual shifting of responsibility for crime control, from citizens to the police” (p. 140). 
Writing at a time when crime was rising rapidly in most Western countries, they add: 
 
This shift in responsibility from the citizenry to the police has been accompanied by a shift in 
expectations with regard to their respective roles and competence as crime control agents. 
Here again, police have accepted increasing levels of public expectation. Indeed, the police 
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have greatly overestimated the extent to which they could control crime and in so doing have 
greatly inflated public expectations. Moreover, raising citizens’ expectations in regard to the 
role and competence of the police has had the effect of reinforcing citizens’ acceptance of a 
diminished role and declining competence in crime control. (Engstad and Evans 1980, 140–
41) 
 
Thus, crime control was gradually transferred from private to public bodies, leading to a form 
of “de-responsibilization.”i  
 The assumption that the state is both responsible for and competent in crime control, 
coupled with the price paid for these services through our taxes, residualizes citizen 
responsibility for crime control. Although many take precautions to protect themselves, 
citizens largely become adjuncts of state crime control, simply acting as voluntary witnesses 
or reporters of crime, or passing on suspected malefactors to competent state authorities.  
 Ekblom (1986) describes a business sector response to a crime problem rooted in the 
then-prevailing assumption about state responsibility for crime control and the role of the 
private sector that follows. His study concerned shoplifting at HMV, a large store in 
London’s Oxford Street that sold audio-cassettes, records, videotapes, computers and 
computer tapes. Stores such as these had (and still have) an interest in preventing these 
crimes because of the consequential losses.  
 HMV was a popular target for shoplifters and in light of that the store employed six 
uniformed security guards and five plain-clothes store detectives. The idea was to detect 
offenders and pass them to the police. In one respect HMV’s security staff were successful—
in 1985 they accounted for 420 of 1,074 arrests (39 percent) for shoplifting dealt with by the 
Shoplifting Unit at the local police station, which covered a large number of major stores in 
London’s West End. 
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 HMV’s approach to crime control treated the state as the body ultimately responsible 
for crime prevention. HMV’s job was only to identify offenders, hand them over to the 
police, and be witnesses if needed in courts of law. They were, essentially, adjuncts to the 
state as the authority that could control crime.  
 As the next section notes, there is extensive and compelling evidence that situational 
contingencies in the hands of the private sector can be altered in ways that prevent crimes. In 
HMV, however, this was not the approach adopted. The store’s arrest policies assumed that 
crime control had to do with dealing with offenders, who were passed on to the police. There 
was no evidence, however, that those arrested were hardened criminals rather than those 
responding to the opportunities provided by the shop.  
 
4. The private sector can implement successful measures to control crime by reducing 
opportunities, temptations, and provocations. 
 There are many examples of alterations in situational contingencies that have 
prevented crimes (Guerette 2009; Clarke and Bowers 2017). Here are examples relating to 
car theft, shop theft, and crime and disorder in and around clubs and pubs. 
 
a) Car theft. Drops in car crime since the early 1990s resulted in large part from 
improvements to their inbuilt security, notably the installation of electronic 
immobilizers but also high-quality window and door locks, central locking, and 
alarms (Farrell et al. 2011, Farrell, Tseloni, and Tilley 2011; Farrell, Tilley, and 
Tseloni 2014; Brown 2013). There is also some evidence that improvements in the 
security of parking lots reduced car theft within them (Smith, Gregson, and Morgan 
2003). Moreover, action to reduce “debut crimes” such as car theft may have 
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produced wider crime prevention benefits by inhibiting the onset of criminal careers 
(Farrell, Laycock, and Tilley 2015). 
b) Shop theft. Overall levels of shop theft have been falling in many countries, as 
measured by well-conducted commercial victimization surveys.  Hopkins and Gill 
(2017), for example, report that in England and Wales the Commercial Victimisation 
Survey found that between 1993 and 2015, the prevalence of shop theft fell from 470 
to 220 and the incidence rate from 22,286 to 8,862 per 1,000 premises. There is 
growing evidence that shops themselves can and have reduced their vulnerability by 
alterations in their shop layouts, displays, and use of security measures such as 
electronic and dye tags (DiLonardo and Clarke 1996; Farrington et al. 1993; Clarke 
and Petrossian 2013; Sidebottom et al. 2016). 
c) Crime and disorder in and around clubs and pubs. Some bars, nightclubs, and 
entertainment districts have adopted broad strategies as well as specific measures to 
reduce violence and harms caused by violence (Homel et al. 1997; Macintyre and 
Homel 1997; Maguire and Nettleton 2003). Layout (for example to avoid collisions), 
management practices (for example policies on serving drinks), and the replacement 
of annealed glass (which breaks into splinters and can cause serious disfiguring 
injuries in fights) with plastic or toughened glass have all been directed at reducing 
crime associated with bars and the harms that follow. Shared codes of conduct have 
been developed and enforced in some problem areas requiring bars to maintain 
standards and compete on the basis of service rather than the price of alcohol, with the 
aim of reducing crime and disorder.  
 In each case, the private sector has accepted some responsibility (albeit often 
reluctantly) for controlling the crime it unintentionally produces, using a range of techniques 
that reduce opportunity and temptation (especially in the case of car theft and shoplifting) and 
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provocation (especially in the case of bars, clubs, and entertainment districts). Trends in all 
cases suggest that the measures adopted have been successful.  
 
5. The privatization of crime control has activated market mechanisms that have led to the 
development and use of effective and benign means of reducing opportunities and 
temptations to commit crime. 
 Shearing and Stenning (1992) describe benign but pervasive private controls at 
Disney World. As they put it: 
 
Control strategies are embedded in both environmental features and structural relations. In 
both cases control structures and activities have other functions which are highlighted so that 
the control function is overshadowed. Nonetheless, control is pervasive. For example, 
virtually every pool, fountain, and flower garden serves as both an aesthetic object and to 
direct visitors away from, or towards, particular locations. Similarly, every Disney 
Productions employee, while visibly and primarily engaged in other functions, is also 
engaged in the maintenance of order. The integration of functions is real and not simply an 
appearance: beauty is created, safety is protected, employees are helpful. The effect is, 
however, to embed the control function into the “woodwork” where its presence is unnoticed 
but its effects are ever present. (Shearing and Stenning 1992, 251) 
 
 Shearing and Stenning go on to note that, ‘While this new instrumental discipline is 
rapidly becoming a dominant force in social control it is as different from the Orwellian 
totalitarian nightmare as it is from the carceral regime…” (Shearing and Stenning 1992, 254). 
 Disney World clearly has commercial interests in inconspicuous but effective control 
that enables its many visitors to enjoy themselves. The business would be less profitable if it 
risked losing customers fearful that their visits might be blighted by antisocial behavior from 
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others. The whole experience needs to be fun, and this requires order that is produced 
apparently spontaneously rather than by overt interventions by specialist or uniformed 
guards. 
 The attributes of benign security of the kind provided at Disney World are captured in 
the acronym DAPPER (Tilley et al. 2015). DAPPER security is “elegant.”  DAPPER refers 
to Default (Disney World’s default state is that it is orderly and secure for visitors), Aesthetic 
(the security provided is unobtrusive and woven into the fabric of Disney World), Powerful 
(there is negligible disorder at Disney World, despite the large number of people there and 
the long lines for many attractions); Principled (the security does not threaten civil liberties 
and is acceptable by all), Effortless (Disney World’s security requires no effort by visitors 
and is incorporated into other parts of design and function that have other main purposes), 
and Rewarding (the benefits of the security exceed costs to both Disney World and its 
clients). 
 DAPPER attributes for elegant security were first highlighted in relation to vehicle 
security, where a range of technological developments improving security have played a 
major part in the steep fall in car theft in many countries (Farrell et al. 2011, Farrell, Tseloni, 
and Tilley 2011). The car’s default state is that it is secure (central locking doors, windows, 
and trunk; priming of alarm and of electronic immobilizer on leaving the vehicle; lock nuts to 
wheels; automatic folding wing mirrors; audio system and satnav components distributed 
through the vehicle, and so on). The additional security now incorporated into the car does 
not reduce any aesthetic qualities it has. The security measures are powerful (they are very 
effective).  The devices incorporated into vehicles are principled (they are acceptable to all 
and do not reduce civil liberties). The security is effortless (the driver has to do less and less 
for the vehicle to be left in a secure state). Finally, the inbuilt security is rewarding (the 
 13
additional costs of inbuilt security are small in relation to the total cost of vehicles and the 
benefits in terms of reduced crime risk high).  
 Table 1 tries to distinguish more from less DAPPER security as it relates to car theft, 
shop theft, and crimes in and around bars. In each case, it could be expected that customers 
and clients would prefer the DAPPER alternatives. 
 
TABLE 1  
More and Less Elegant Security for Cars, Shops, and Licensed Premises 
[table 1 about here] 
 Dependency on the state to control crime remains rational so long as the risks of and 
losses from crime levels remain relatively low. Once these risks and losses (or perceptions of 
them) reach a certain level then there are incentives to take private action. The state may still 
be deemed responsible, but its competency comes into question, at which point private action 
becomes more likely. Moreover, once a sufficient market for security develops, competition 
between providers should occur and with that competition providers will attempt to outdo one 
another in terms of the effectiveness, price, and attractiveness of their products and services.  
 
6.  Privatizing crime control can be difficult, even where substantial crime prevention 
benefits may follow, especially where businesses are expected to bear the costs but not to 
benefit financially. 
 As Dennis Challinger, writing from Coles Myer, a major Australian retailer, 
succinctly put it at the start of a paper asking if crime prevention will ever be a priority for 
business, “Businesses exist to make profits” (Challinger 1997, 35). Even if profitability is not 
the sole concern of a business, it is a sine qua non for its long-term survival. Hence, whatever 
the preferences of those working within a business (and acknowledging that many might 
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prefer to behave responsibly) unless an eye is kept on profitability the company will wither. 
In a competitive situation, if one company incurs costs for prevention that others do not and 
those costs are not eventually covered by improved returns then the company puts itself at a 
disadvantage. These commercial realities explain why measures are sometimes adopted or 
not adopted and why strategies may be needed to encourage companies to adopt preventive 
strategies. 
 Even when the direct victim of unintended crime consequences is the business itself, 
for example with shop theft, private control measures may not be taken. There are three main 
reasons for inaction. First, ignorance about loss: shops suffer shrinkage but often do not know 
its exact source. Apparent shrinkage can be created by customer theft; staff theft; short 
deliveries; spoiled, damaged or defective goods; or accounting errors (Beck 2016). 
Misattribution or misunderstanding of the sources of shrinkage may lead either to failure to 
adopt control strategies or the implementation of misdirected ones. Second, ignorance about 
means of prevention: the business may not know how to control crime effectively. Effective 
methods of controlling crime are contested and finding what works can be tricky. The 
“fundamental attribution error” (Ross and Nisbett 2011), is widely held, according to which 
(mis)behavior is over attributed to characteristics of perpetrators (about which commercial 
organizations can do little or nothing) and under-attributed to immediate situations (about 
which commercial organizations can do a great deal). Third, interests: taking a hit from crime 
may be less costly than preventive measures to control it. For example, to maximize sales, the 
layout of the shop and presentation of goods may facilitate crime by making it readily 
available for the customer to handle. The perceived benefits (increased profit) from the 
increased sales may outweigh the perceived costs of its control (Sidebottom et al. 2016).  
 Failure of businesses to act where a third party is the victim is easier to understand.  
Why would they incur costs they could avoid in a competitive environment? This likely 
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explains why motor manufacturers were reluctant to improve security to their vehicles even 
when it was known that they were frequent targets of crime.  
 Notwithstanding commercial interests, it would be a mistake to assume that 
businesses will act to prevent crime only if doing so directly contributes to their economic 
success. Ignorance may still play a part. One study found that supermarkets were hot spots 
for theft of purses from older women who routinely left them in their shopping carts as they 
walked round the aisles. One store in particular had little idea this was happening 
(Sidebottom, Guillaume, and Archer 2012). The business had no vested interest in reducing 
the risks to third parties. On being told of the problem, however, the store agreed to trial the 
use of trollies adapted to provide safe storage for purses. Although the store may have hoped 
that positive publicity would increase customers, there is no direct evidence that this was the 
case. Rather, the store was persuaded that it should bear some costs in trying to make 
vulnerable customers safer.ii The next section discusses various ways in which benign private 
sector efforts at crime control can be encouraged in practice. 
 
7. The public and voluntary sectors have important roles to play in informing, encouraging, 
enabling, underpinning, and extending the benign privatization of crime control. 
 Even though the privatization of crime control can deliver effective and elegant 
security, it will not necessarily do so. There are important roles for the state and voluntary 
sectors in fostering and underpinning the development of benign privatized controls. 
 Potential dangers and downsides of privatizing crime control include: 
  
1. Displacement of crime from the rich to the poor. Privatized control incurs costs more 
easily afforded by the better than the worse off. Crime may migrate from the 
relatively rich to the relatively poor. Some measures to reduce domestic burglary, for 
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example CCTV and advanced alarm systems, are costly and tend to be installed by the 
better off. If displacement occurs it may be to those unable so easily to afford such 
measures.  
2. Social exclusion. The better off withdraw to their safe enclaves from which the poor 
are kept out. Moreover, those who appear out of place are prevented from entering 
semi-public places such as shopping malls in the interests of increasing the comfort of 
better off shoppers. 
3. Guns and violence. Whereas privately owned handguns may reduce risks of some 
forms of crime by providing deterrence, their widespread ownership creates 
opportunities for deliberate shootings and risks of accidental ones, with fatal 
consequences. 
4. Fortresses. Many forms of private security, such as window bars, are ugly and spoil 
the appearance of cities. 
5. Noisy alarms. Some private security devices create their own nuisances, for example 
malfunctioning alarms. 
6. Skewed use of public crime control resources. As with the HMV example cited earlier 
private crime controls can produce demands on the public police. The opportunity 
cost is their nonavailability for other purposes. 
7. Ineffective measures. Those hoping to profit from their crime prevention devices are 
apt to over claim their effectiveness in the interests of sales. Moreover, buyers are 
attracted by cheap but inelegant measures where the state is expected to control crime 
and private security is purchased grudgingly. 
8. Anxiety about crime. Selling security depends on creating demand, which deliberately 
or otherwise creates exaggerated fears of crime, which in turn may lead some citizens 
to restrict their social lives. 
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9. Victim blaming. Those responsible for crimes are the offenders themselves. 
Bestowing responsibility on potential victims for self-protection, implicitly assigns 
them responsibility for crimes committed against them. 
10. Buck passing. It is the responsibility of the state in general and the police in particular 
to prevent crime. Shifting responsibility for crime control to others involves evasion 
by the public body created to perform the task. 
 
 A dystopian vision is, thus, easy to produce. Private security protects the rich with 
ugly, high walls, heavy-handed security guards, and firearms. The rich mobilize the 
machinery of the state to supplement their private security. The poor are physically and 
symbolically excluded from some activities and places, for example wandering in smart 
shopping malls or entering fashionable suburbs. Beyond the safe enclaves of the relatively 
rich lie the badlands. Here, the stronger prey on the weaker. In obviously dangerous public 
spaces, never entered by the better off, fearful and vulnerable citizens prey on one another.  
 Given the argument so far that a) private controls can be well targeted, effective, and 
benign, b) many crimes are costly byproducts of successful private enterprises, and that c) the 
state is poorly placed to deliver effective controls over them, we need to work out what the 
state can do to foster more benign (DAPPER), and avert more malign, preventive approaches.  
The following is a tentative list of roles for the state and voluntary sectors.  
 First, the state must set the rules that constitute crime. Many citizens and corporate 
bodies obey the law simply because it is the law. 
 Second, the state comprises a legitimate guarantor that the risk from committing a 
crime can lead to real penalties. Increasing risk to possible offenders is one major technique 
for reducing crime opportunity. This is meaningful only if backed ultimately by the state.  
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 Third, risks of victimization may be unknown either by those who face them or by 
those who inadvertently create them. The public sector has an important role to play in 
attempting accurately to estimate crime risks and to ensure that those who create them or face 
them understand those risks so that they can develop ways to reduce them. Laycock (2004), 
for example, shows how research from the British Home Office identified which models of 
car were at greatest risk of theft, to indicate where improvements in security were most 
pressing.iii There are other sources of this information also. For example, consumer and 
private research groups have provided information on crime risks that citizens and 
organizations can use to target crime control measures. 
 Fourth, those who face and create risks may not know what they can do to reduce 
them. Although they are not the sole source of such information, state organizations are well 
placed to assess the effectiveness of crime control measures. Consumer organizations and 
independent research agencies can also contribute to this body of knowledge. 
 Fifth, the state restricts what can be done by way of private crime control. In effect, it 
sets rules for what can and cannot be done in an attempt to avert private controls that are 
themselves harmful. If these rules are to be evidence based then publicly funded research is 
preferable to privately funded work where vested interests risk undermining the 
independence and hence reliability of findings. 
 Sixth, the state has a range of tools through which it can promote private crime 
control measures, some of which are more coercive than others. Hardie and Hobbs (2005) 
note that the most obvious means—regulation and self-interest—do not exhaust possibilities. 
External pressure groups, peers, the press and investors, for example, may also motivate 
action (Hardie and Hobbs 2005, 103–5). Although profitability can often be the ultimate 
concern, those in the private sector sometimes take actions simply because they become 
persuaded that it is the right thing to do. 
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 A general principle seems to have emerged for encouraging attention to unintended, 
socially costly side effects of private actions, such as crime. This is that cooperation is 
preferable to coercion (see for example Scott and Goldstein 2005; Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, 
and Vedung 1998; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Eck and Eck 2012). Other things being 
equal, cooperation is faster, better targeted, cheaper, less liable to provoke resistance, more 
likely to lead to increasingly elegant solutions to problems, and less likely to provoke further 
unwanted unintended consequences.  
 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) show formally how and why graduated pressure works 
more effectively than application of a big stick, although the big stick still matters. It is 
widely accepted that cooperation is more likely if there is an iron fist in the velvet glove, 
especially where there are strong vested interests at stake. In other words, the availability, 
ultimately, of state means to coerce the private sector into reducing or eliminating its 
production of negative externalities such as crime, can motivate cooperation, which is 
preferable because it is less costly to both parties. Coercion is best left, where needed, to the 
recalcitrant few.   
 Exploiting the types of motive mentioned by Hardie and Hobbs, both local and 
national government (in conjunction with consumer organizations and the mass media) have 
a range of ways to elicit private sector efforts to control crime short of the creation and 
enforcement of regulations. However, where costs are borne by one business but not others in 
a market, the business taking on those costs is to that extent at a competitive disadvantage. 
Even if any given individual in a private enterprise would rather act altruistically the logic of 
competition puts limits on what can be achieved.  
 Where a market develops for security, it can produce elegant solutions. Again, 
consider car crime. The insurance industry in the United States has used data on claims to 
identify which models of vehicles are associated with the largest human and economic losses, 
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including those from theft (Hazelbaker 1997). The Highway Loss Data Institute lists the 
models with highest and lowest claim rates by type of vehicle, for example very large pickup, 
large luxury SUV, small SUV etc.iv This activity has contributed to a spate of innovations in 
car design, leading to increasingly elegant, DAPPER security measures that are built into 
vehicles. Once a market develops, there are incentives for continuous improvements that will 
be effective and appeal to consumers. Unless kick-started by third party prompts, such as 
those that can be used by governments, these market processes are unlikely to be engaged. 
Eck has highlighted benefits from encouraging the achievement of crime control ends rather 
than the adoption of specific means. Doing so is a way of stimulating (private) efforts to work 
out how to achieve crime prevention outcomes where the specific means are not already well 
established or may need to be tailored to particular contexts (see Eck and Eck 2012; Eck 
2017). 
 That does not mean there are no circumstances when regulation is beneficial and may 
be welcomed by those in the private sector. For instance, suppose costs are incurred by those 
businesses that take action to reduce a given negative externality such as crime. In this 
situation, other businesses, which fail to do so, are at a competitive advantage. Here a 
universal requirement may be preferable to those inclined to do the right thing. This occurred 
when there was a European directive requiring that cars be fitted with an electronic 
immobilizer that met minimum standards. In the case of electronic immobilizers, a strong 
known specific measure was at issue, whose universal application might eventually engender 
a form of herd immunity from crime but where free riders might be tempted to avoid the 
costs involved. In these circumstances, it may make sense to require universal measures from 




8. The public sector’s own efforts to regulate behavior can be criminogenic, inadvertently 
creating temptations and opportunities for crime. “Elegant” regulation would aim to avoid 
these consequences. 
 States themselves sometimes inadvertently create opportunities for crime. Motorcar 
registration systems, for example, may take a form that facilitates the easy alternation of the 
identity of a stolen car, which can then be sold (Webb, Smith, and Laycock 2004). Prisons 
run by the state may be designed and run in ways that unintentionally enable or provoke 
crimes among inmates and between inmates and staff (Wortley 2002). Hospitals may be 
designed and operated in ways that inadvertently foster costly crime opportunities or 
provocations (Smith 1987). Regulatory regimes may again inadvertently provoke criminal 
behaviors (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992).  In each case, government is able directly to act in 
ways that minimize provocation and opportunity.  Indeed, there is a literature on ways in 
which unintended opportunities and provocations can be reduced (see Savona 2017). As with 
crime prevention as it relates to car crime, the direction of travel would most sensibly be 
toward elegance albeit here governments are able to act directly.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has sketched an argument in favor of privatizing crime control through reducing 
crime opportunities, temptations, and provocations. This is not to say there is no role for the 
public sector. As indicated, the public sector has an important part to play in extending and 
fostering benign private controls and in attending to crime opportunities it may itself 
unintentionally supply. 
 The case made here builds on Freilich and Newman’s argument in favor of using 
situational crime prevention to deal with crime problems at the local and national levels 
(Freilich and Newman 2016). At both levels, there is a crucial role for private crime control. 
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However, re-responsibilizing third parties for crime control will often be difficult. Moreover, 
responsible re-responsibilization (where third parties apply only benign measures) consists of 
a further challenge. Heavy-handed regulation may not be the best first method to choose in 
encouraging the private sector to devise and implement effective and ethical private crime 
controls. There is much to be said in favor of stimulating a market, which will incentivize 
innovation and the voluntary application of elegant forms of crime control. This article 
provides a modest step toward thinking through what may be needed to achieve this. 
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